SECRETARY NAPOLITANO’S REMARKS ON
DHS’ ONGOING EFFORTS
TO BOLSTER INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY
BEFORE THE AERO CLUB OF
SECRETARY
NAPOLITANO: Thank you. Thank you, Lisa [Piccione], for the
introduction. Thank you to the Aero Club for giving me this opportunity to
speak. I'm very glad to be here with you all today.
I can tell you that
as the person who has FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] in her
Department, to my knowledge, there are no new volcanoes erupting - at least
within the United States. We have the Coast Guard in our jurisdiction, and we
are heavily involved in events in the southern states and in particular, the
sinking of a fairly major deep water oil rig off the coast of
I'm not here to talk
necessarily about volcanoes or about oil rigs before this audience. What I
thought I would do is share with you what we have been doing at TSA
[Transportation Security Administration], particularly in light of the
attempted attack on Christmas Day, and some of the events that have unfolded
since then, and say we are really moving, I think, in a very productive and
cooperative way to make sure that not only does the domestic aviation
environment remain safe and secure but the international—the global aviation
environment is safe and secure.
Let me, if I might,
make some remarks, and then I will open the floor for whatever questions you
have on what I have discussed or any other topics of interest.
I think we begin
with the fact that the aviation system has served us well. It has served us
well as a country and it has served the international economic environment - the
international environment very well.
Every week, some
2,500 commercial flights carrying half a million passengers land in the
The international
flight environment - the flight environment in general is a tremendous engine. It
is a tremendous engine of economic progress. It is a tremendous facilitator for
tourism - for families to get together. I think this audience - I'm seeing heads
nodding - understands very well and very fundamentally how important this
industry is.
Its importance,
perhaps, leads to the fact that it has been and remains a central target of
those who would ally to attack the global aviation environment, the world
environment - who would ally to attack the United States or its allies—the U.K.
[United Kingdom], for example.
We have the 9/11
attack and of course, the attempted attack in December to show that al-Qaeda affiliated
groups continue to believe that aviation, commercial aviation, is the load
star, perhaps, of their ability to really disrupt the western way of life.
By the way, they are
not so concerned with just taking down citizens of the
We also know that
they are continuing to train, to evolve, to update their own trade craft - to
exploit perceived gaps in the system. For example, on December 25, you did not
see a big complicated conspiracy. You saw one individual - who by the way
should have been on either the no-fly selectee list, but was not, and I will
get to that in a moment - but carrying a powdered material that would not be
picked up by a magnetometer, placed in a place where pat downs are not normally
done, or not done carefully, exploited all those gaps to get PETN on a
commercial airliner.
His very flight
illustrates the global nature of the international system. He got on a plane in
The very attempted
attack on Christmas really shows us that our adversaries are determined and
fairly astute as to where perceived gaps in the system are.
What has happened
since Christmas? The
President Obama has
requested an additional $900 million in the 2011 budget to accelerate the pre-planned
- already planned - deployment of the advanced imaging technology machinery in
American airports. His funding also would in 2011 further increase the number
of air marshals, K-9 teams, and explosive detection devices in airports around
the
I know that there
has been some concern about the AIT [Advanced Imaging Technology] machines - some
from a privacy perspective. Let me just say in my view, the current iterations
of the machines, and there are different ones made by different manufacturers,
we understand that, but the current iterations really have addressed the
privacy concerns that were raised by the original introduction of the
technology.
A second concern is
just their physical placement within the airport environment - how that matches
with where you set up for magnetometers, because they do require that those
watching and reviewing the screens be located differently from where the
machines actually are.
We have met and I
have met with representatives of the actual airport associations, but that is
one of the things we are working with you all on in terms of actual
installation.
We think by the end
of 2010, there will be 450 of the AIT machines that will have been installed
and will be up over 1,000 by next year. They are objectively better than the
magnetometers alone. They are objectively better in detecting anomalies by
which people may be trying to bring powders, gels, other liquid explosives onto
a plane.
But in addition to
deploying those, we have entered into agreements through the Department of
Energy, and they have now entered into agreements with the National Labs, to really
think about at the cutting-edge level, what proactively is the airport
checkpoint of the future, and how can we deploy some of our cutting-edge science
to really think beyond even the AIT machines coupled with other things to
different ways to make sure that whoever enters the airport itself, much less
the airplane, is safe and secure and is not at risk.
That is underway and
is all part of what President Obama directed immediately following Christmas
Day. He also directed that the National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC] and the
FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] - who are the two primary generators of
the watch lists - fix the problems that led to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab not
being a selectee or a no-fly on a name that was available at least in Amsterdam
when he attempted to board Flight 253.
As you know, we
don't screen terrorists abroad. We work with foreign airports and foreign
authorities to do that. We also ourselves don't prepare the watch lists. We do
have a role in providing some names for the watch list, but they are the
primary responsibility of the NCTC and the FBI, who have already taken major
steps to repair the series of errors that had to occur for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's
name not to be on them.
In addition to that,
we are pushing out a lot more information abroad so that it is available
overseas before somebody boards an airplane, not just at customs when they
attempt to enter the
That has allowed us
to do one very important thing, and it may have affected some of your customers
or representatives or the like, but as you know, we entered into a 14 country
protocol immediately after Christmas with the consultation and agreement of our
State Department—that anybody who was from or whose itinerary had taken them
through one of 14 countries, was to be subject to enhanced screening. That, of
course, was a very rough way of getting at the problem we were trying to solve
from a protection standpoint.
We are now able and
have been able to withdraw that 14 country protocol and substitute for it a
separate one that is a rules-based protocol, and the rules themselves are
derived from intelligence that is provided to us from a variety of sources. The
rules are ever-changing, but it allows us to focus on evolving risks and
passengers as opposed to something as rough cut as 14 countries.
That system is being
deployed now. We are in the process of making sure it is fully implemented.
What else are we
doing? We have in addition to the enhancements for domestic airports and in
addition to a better way to deal with the watch lists and the 14 country rule
and its withdrawal, we have also embarked on an international aviation initiative.
The fact that Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab got on in Nigeria and within an hour was in Amsterdam - and
within hours was on his way to Detroit - illustrates the very global nature of
the problem. The fact that once somebody gets on in one airport - that is an
international airport -they potentially have access to all of them.
Really, the week
after Christmas when we really backed up a little bit from the initial flurry
to say, “Alright, how do we work the problem? What is the problem we are trying
to solve?” We immediately recognized that we could do all these things
domestically but it was the international part that we also needed to work on
simultaneously.
I sent the Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Assistant Secretary for Policy on an
around the world trip—around the world in 12 days - to meet with security and
other staff in a variety of countries. I won't give you their itinerary. I can
tell you they looked a little weary when they got back to Washington, D.C. - I
will tell you that.
In any event, the
goal was to really think of this globally and to start preparing a series of
meetings at my level - ministerial level - that's how they are known in the
global environment, on raising airport and airline security.
At the same time, the
Undersecretary for NPPD [National Protection and Programs Directorate] went to
Montreal to meet with the new Executive Director of ICAO [International Civil
Aviation Organization] - the U.N.'s [United Nations] aviation branch - to talk
about ICAO being a participant and a leader in a global aviation initiative. They
readily agreed.
We have since then
had a series of meetings beginning in Toledo, Spain, where we had a number of
the EU [European Union] countries present there, the Spain Minister of the Interior
allowed us to sort of interject ourselves in their pre-established agenda, and
out of that came a very strong declaration know as the Toledo Declaration.
We went to
We went to
The most recent one
was in
We are going to the
I think that - in
and of itself - will allow us to really use it as the catalyst to raise
aviation standards globally.
We have not been
doing this without the private sector. For example, immediately after I was in
I met with IATA but
we also have been meeting with the CEOs of the American Flag Carriers and with
the ATA [Air Transport Association] to make sure that we are really thinking
through this and working through this in a way that takes into account
operational needs, structural needs, the absolute need for security even as we
deal with that massive passenger traffic that I described at the opening of my
remarks.
A number of
countries have already taken unilateral action. The
Let me conclude on a
very positive note. I believe, as I said before, that these efforts will
achieve a binding international consensus that will make significant strides
toward a more safe and secure aviation system—not only for the United States
but for all nations.
I believe that the
nations of the world have an important and indeed an urgent opportunity to
strengthen what has been the global lifeblood of travel and commerce over the
past 50 years. I believe that the peoples of all nations of the world share the
threat of violence and terrorism -violence resulting from violent extremism. That
being the case, we all share the responsibility for safeguarding a system that
is so essential to the world and the world of the 21st Century.
There is in my view
a false dichotomy that is sometimes created between being able to have security
and protection and being able to also protect our privacy and our civil
liberties. I believe that to be a false dichotomy - that we can do both.
I also believe there
is a false dichotomy between what the government does and what industry does. We
have to - particularly in this area - be knit together and create and maintain
a very secure architecture of security in the aviation arena, and we are doing
just that.
We want to make
aviation safe, secure and as efficient as possible. I know that's what the
members of the Aero Club want to do as well. I thank you for having me. I
appreciate the opportunity to speak with you.